The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/wordperf/1991/91_7358a/91_7358a.zs

Text File | 1993-04-20 | 10KB | 145 lines

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.  The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United                                                                     ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.______    ___________________

                       SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                    Syllabus

      BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON, SUPERINTENDENT, DODGE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION            ____

    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

         No. 91-7358.   Argued December 1, 1992 - Decided April 21, 1993

At his first-degree murder trial in Wisconsin state court, petitioner Brecht
 admitted shooting the victim, but claimed it was an accident.  In order to
 impeach this testimony, the State, inter alia, made several references to the                                    ___________
 fact that, before he was given his Miranda warnings at an arraignment, Brecht                                    _______
 failed to tell anyone with whom he came in contact that the shooting was
 accidental.  The State also made several references to his post-Miranda-                                                                 _______
 warning silence in this regard.  The jury returned a guilty verdict and Brecht
 was sentenced to life in prison, but the State Court of Appeals set the
 conviction aside on the grounds that the State's references to his post-
 Miranda silence violated due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, and _______                                    _____    _____
 this error was sufficiently ``prejudicial'' to require reversal.  The State
 Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding that the error was
 ```harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' '' under the standard set forth in
 Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24.  The Federal District Court disagreed _______    ___________
 and set aside the conviction on habeas review. In reversing, the Court of
 Appeals held that the proper standard of harmless-error review was that set
 forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776, i.e., whether the          _________    ______________                     _____
 Doyle violation ```had substantial and injurious effect or influence in _____
 determining the jury's verdict.'''  Applying this standard, the court
 concluded that Brecht was not entitled to relief.

Held:_____
   1.  The Kotteakos harmless-error standard, rather than the Chapman standard,           _________                                          _______
 applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of
 unconstitutional ``trial error'' such as the Doyle error at issue.  Pp. 6-17.                                                _____
















                                                                    I           II                            BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON                                    ____

                                    Syllabus

   (a)  The State's references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence violated Doyle.                                                 _______                  ______
 The Doyle rule rests on the Miranda warnings' implicit assurance that a     _____                   _______
 suspect's silence will not be used against him, and on the fundamental
 unfairness of using postwarning silence to impeach an explanation subsequently
 offered at trial.  It is conceivable that, once Brecht was given his warnings,
 he decided to stand on his right to remain silent because he believed his
 silence would not be used against him at trial.  The prosecution's references
 to his pre-Miranda silence were, however, entirely proper.  Such silence is            _______
 probative and does not rest on any implied assurance by law enforcement
 authorities that it will carry no penalty.  Pp. 6-7.
   (b)  Doyle error fits squarely into the category of constitutional violations        _____
 characterized by this Court as ``trial error.''  See Arizona v. Fulminante,                                                      _______    ___________
 499 U. S. ___, ___.  Such error occurs during the presentation of the case to
 the jury, and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it may be
 quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence to determine its
 effect on the trial.  See id., at ___.  This Court has consistently applied                           ____
 the Chapman standard in reviewing claims of constitutional error of the trial     _______
 type on direct review of state and federal criminal proceedings.  Pp. 7-9.
   (c)  It is for the Court to determine what harmless-error standard applies on
 collateral review of Brecht's Doyle claim.  Although the Court has applied the                               _____
 Chapman standard in a handful of federal habeas cases, stare decisis does not _______                                                _____________
 preclude adoption of the Kotteakos standard here, since the decisions in                          _________
 question never squarely addressed, but merely assumed, Chapman's applicability                                                        _______
 on collateral review.  Nor has Congress provided express guidance on the
 question.  The federal habeas statute is silent as to the applicable standard,
 and while the federal harmless-error statute appears to echo the Kotteakos                                                                  _________
 standard, it has been limited in its application to claims of
 nonconstitutional error in federal criminal cases.  In line with the
 traditional rule, the Court finds no reason to draw inferences from Congress'
 failure to enact post-Chapman proposals that would have provided a less                       _______
 stringent harmless-error standard on collateral review of constitutional
 error.  Pp. 8-12.
   (d)  The Kotteakos standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of            _________
 collateral review than the Chapman standard, and is more likely to promote the                            _______
 considerations underlying this Court's recent habeas jurisprudence.  In
 recognition of the historical distinction between direct review as the
 principal way to challenge a conviction and collateral review as an
 extraordinary remedy whose role is secondary and limited, the Court has often
 applied different standards on habeas than on direct review.  It scarcely
 seems logical to require federal habeas courts to engage in the same approach
 that                              BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON                           III                                    ____

                                    Syllabus

 Chapman requires of state courts on direct review, since the latter courts are _______
 fully qualified to identify constitutional error and are often better situated
 to evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process.  Absent affirmative
 evidence that state-court judges are ignoring their oath, Brecht's argument is
 unpersuasive that such courts will respond to the application of Kotteakos on                                                                  _________
 federal habeas by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution.
 In any event, the additional deterrent effect, if any, of applying Chapman on                                                                    _______
 federal habeas is outweighed by the costs of that application, which
 undermines the States' interest in finality and infringes upon their
 sovereignty over criminal matters; is at odds with habeas' purpose of
 affording relief only to those grievously wronged; imposes significant
 ``social costs,'' including the expenditure of additional time and resources
 by all of the parties, the erosion of memory and the dispersion of witnesses,
 and the frustration of society's interest in the prompt administration of
 justice; and results in retrials that take place much later than those
 following reversal on direct appeal.  This imbalance of costs and benefits
 counsels in favor of application of the less onerous Kotteakos standard on                                                      _________
 collateral review, under which claimants are entitled to relief for trial
 error only if they can establish that ``actual prejudice'' resulted.  See
 United States v. Lane, 474 U. S. 438, 449.  Because the Kotteakos standard is _____________    _____                                  _________
 grounded in the federal harmless-error rule (28 U. S. C. S2111), federal
 courts may turn to an existing body of case law and, thus, are unlikely to be
 confused in applying it.  Pp. 12-17.
    2.  It is clear that the Doyle error at Brecht's trial did not                             _____
 ``substantially influence'' the jury's verdict within the meaning of
 Kotteakos, since the record, considered as a whole, demonstrates that the __________
 State's references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence were infrequent and were,                                     _______
 in effect, merely cumulative of the extensive and permissible references to
 his pre-Miranda silence; that the evidence of his guilt was, if not         _______
 overwhelming, certainly weighty; and that circumstantial evidence also pointed
 to his guilt.  Thus, Brecht is not entitled to habeas relief.  Pp. 17-18.

944 F. 2d 1363, affirmed.

 REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  STEVENS, J., filed a concurring
opinion.  WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined,
and in which SOUTER, J., joined except for the footnote and Part III.  BLACKMUN,
O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., filed dissenting opinions.